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Major emergencies are extreme team decision making environments. They are complex, 
dynamic, high-stakes and fast paced events, wherein successful resolution is contingent upon 
effective teamwork. Not only do emergency teams coordinate at the intra-team level (e.g., 
Police team), but they are increasingly required to operate at the inter-team level (e.g., Police, 
Fire and Ambulance teams). This is in response to the desire for networked and cost-effective 
practice and due to the evolving nature of modern threats, such as extreme weather events 
and terrorist attacks, which require a multi- rather than single-agency response. Yet the 
capacity for interoperability between emergency teams is under researched and poorly 
understood. Much of the teamwork research is based on student-samples or in artificial lab 
settings, reducing the salient contextual demands of emergencies (e.g., high-stakes, 
meaningful risk). Furthermore, the minimal research that has been conducted has tended to 
provide broad descriptive accounts of challenges faced during emergencies, but failed to 
develop and test solutions. This paper identifies what is known about emergency teams and 
highlights why it is an important and timely area for research.  It will focus on the challenges 
and solutions to three areas of team processing: cooperation; coordination and 
communication. Future research must have a solutions-focussed approach. This can be 
oriented around areas: training, socio-technical networks, and policies/procedural guidelines. 
Greater collaboration between academics and practitioners can grow knowledge in this 
domain, ensuring that interventions to improve emergency teamwork are both contextually 
grounded and empirically validated. 





Extreme Teams: Towards a Greater Understanding of Multi-Agency Teamwork During 
Major Emergencies and Disasters 
 
Major emergencies, either manmade or as the result of natural disasters, are extreme 
team decision events. They are characterized by the potential for mass casualties, crowds, 
public enquiries, media and involve the coordinated response of emergency services and 
supporting organizations (Cabinet Office, 2013). They are complex, dynamic, high-stakes 
and fast paced contexts, wherein successful resolution is contingent upon effective teamwork 
and collaboration (James, 2011). Examples of real-world major emergencies include natural 
disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina (2005) and the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004), and man-
made disasters, such as the terrorist attacks in Paris (2015), Brussels (2016) and across the 
UK (2017), and the safety failures that contributed to the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011). 
Major emergencies are intense contexts wherein individuals and teams make critical choices 
whilst managing ambiguity and complexity (Millitello, Sushreba, Branlat, Bean & Finomore, 
2015). This creates significant demands on the physical, psychological and interpersonal 
skills of individuals and teams (James, 2011; Orasanu & Lierberman, 2011).  
Psychological research can help us to better understand how emergency teams operate 
under extremes. However, there has been little research that has explored emergency 
teamwork, taking into account the high-risk and extreme uncertainty involved in such 
contexts, and the tendency for teams to be inter-organizational, meaning that team members 
are often unfamiliar to each other. Furthermore, the research that has been conducted in 
emergency settings has largely focused on narrative accounts of the broad challenges to 
emergency management and paid comparatively little attention to how research can be used 
to design and test interventions to facilitate emergency teamwork. This paper aims to 
engender and shape the trajectory of future research in this field by: (i) highlighting the 
Running	head:	EXTREME	TEAMS	AND	MAJOR	EMERGENCIES	
	 4	
uniquely challenging context under which emergency teams operate; (ii) embed the limited 
research that has been conducted within a team processing framework; and (iii) advocate the 
need for more solutions-focused research oriented around the empirical validation and testing 
of interventions to improve emergency teamwork.  
Importantly, this paper will focus on factors that influence team processing (i.e., the 
coordinating mechanisms and behaviors that are used by team members to achieve collective 
goals during a task); namely, coordination, cooperation and communication (Wilson, Salas, 
Priest & Andrews, 2007). Unlike traditional organizational teams who have stable structures 
and work together regularly, emergency teams form rapidly in response to unanticipated 
crises; making them dynamic and reactionary, wherein ‘team processing’ is of paramount 
importance to facilitate fast and life-saving action. Thus, rather than adopt a temporal 
perspective of teamwork by considering the mediating impact of emergent states that develop 
over the lifetime of a stable team (e.g., team cohesion; see Marks, Mathieu & Zaccaro, 2001), 
this paper will focus on team processes that take place during an episode of teamwork. In 
support of this, it will identify how solutions to improve team processing might be achieved 
by investing research in three areas where interventions might be most effective: training to 
support the preparedness of emergency teams; socio-technical networks to support common 
understanding during emergencies; and changes to policies and procedures that can help 
support the overall resilience of emergency teams. 
Teamwork during emergencies: what we know so far 
What is an emergency team? A team is defined as two or more individuals working 
together in pursuit of a common goal. Teamwork is described as the “set of interrelated 
thoughts, actions, and feelings of each team member… that combine to facilitate coordinated 
adaptive performance and task objectives resulting in value-added outcomes” (p.562; Salas 
et al., 2005). Emergency teams engage in teamwork whilst operating in uniquely stressful, 
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high-stakes, pressurized and complex environments. When a major incident occurs, it triggers 
the establishment of a number of different sub-teams operating at different levels, who must 
operate interdependently in order to achieve both individual and collective goals. In the UK 
for example, the Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) structure is used to create a 
hierarchy of command, from operational (actions at scene) to tactical (take charge at the 
scene) to strategic (overall executive command) (DOH, 2005; Salmon, Stanton, Jenkins & 
Walker 2011). At the ground level, there are emergency response teams (Police, Fire, 
Ambulance) who coordinate their behavior at both single and multi-team levels to deal with 
the emergency itself. At the operational level, there are incident commanders who must direct 
their team and coordinate operations with commanders from the other core emergency 
services at the scene. At the tactical level, representatives from the emergency services and 
other civil services (e.g., highways agency, utilities) coordinate tactical objectives and act as 
the conduit between the operational actions being carried out on-scene and the strategic 
directives that are outlined by their superiors. Finally, the strategic team, which involves the 
most senior representatives from the emergency services along with civil authorities (e.g., 
local council, government) are responsible for setting strategic directives, dealing with the 
media and making plans for recovery after the incident. A successful emergency response is 
dependent upon effective teamwork across and between multiple sub-team levels.  
An opportunity for researchers interested in emergency teams is to explore, challenge 
and test structures that are used to support interoperability and maximize performance. A 
unique feature of emergency teams is their rapid and dynamic make up, wherein responders 
are required to coordinate behavior (at single- and multi-team levels) without necessarily 
having worked together before. The role of the researcher is to question whether existing 
organizational structures, such as IEM, support teamwork in emergency contexts or whether 
adaptations, based on what we have learnt from more general teamwork literature, can be 
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incorporated; for example, might the multiple command layers within IEM create ambiguity 
about who is ultimately in charge, especially if team members are unfamiliar with each other? 
Academic research that is independent of these organizations can be useful for exploring 
these types of questions.  
Due to the tendency for emergency teams to form rapidly and involve multiple layers 
of teams and individuals who are unfamiliar to each other, it is argued that research should 
primarily focus on identifying solutions to facilitate the ‘team processes’ that happen during 
task-related teamwork (i.e., an emergency incident). Team processes enable team members to 
achieve collective goals by structuring task-relevant behavior, and are themed into three 
types: (i) coordination (i.e., using behavioral and cognitive mechanisms to transform team 
action into goal-related outcomes); (ii) communication (i.e., the reciprocal process of sending 
and receiving information between team members to inform attitudes, behaviors and 
cognitions); and (iii) cooperation (i.e., the motivational drivers related to attitudes, beliefs and 
feelings that inspire team members to work together) (Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas & 
Cannon-Bowers, 2000; Salas, Shuffler, Thayer, Bedwell & Lazzara, 2015). In their 
examination of fratricide (friendly fire) in war contexts, Wilson, et al. (2007) identified how 
inappropriate phraseology (communication), poor shared mental models (coordination) and a 
lack of mutual trust and collective efficacy (cooperation) contributed to teamwork 
breakdowns; whereas adaptive team processes such as the use of closed-loop 
communications, mutual performance monitoring (coordination) and cohesion (cooperation) 
have been found to facilitate team performance (Espevik, Johnsen & Eid, 2011; Salas, Sims 
& Burke, 2005). Team processes reflect the team’s capacity to perform effectively during a 
given task, which makes them of central importance to research. The purpose of this paper 
will be to use this team processing framework in order to structure what we know and what 
remains to be researched with emergency teams. 
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Research on the management of major disasters and emergencies. Despite its rich 
history, psychological research on teamwork has been inconsistent and fragmented, meaning 
that its application and understanding in the real world is limited (Salas et al., 2005). In his 
review of 32 major disasters in the UK, Pollock (2013) identified how serious teamwork 
failures were repeated time and again due to the inability to embed lessons from past events. 
Every one of the 32 reports outlined recommendations to improve: doctrine and organization; 
operational communications; shared situational awareness; and training and exercising. For 
example, recommendations following the Dunblane shootings at a primary school in Scotland 
in 1996 included improvements in cordoning procedures and data recording (doctrine and 
organization), prioritizing incoming/outgoing calls (operational communication), sharing 
information with other emergency services and relatives (shared situational awareness) and 
ensuring school staff were better prepared to deal with emergencies (training and exercising). 
Yet lessons such as these have persistently failed to be embedded across the 24 years of 
major incidents that he reviewed. Furthermore, there are concerns that disaster research over 
recent years has been overly dominated by the desire to develop technological solutions, 
ignoring human-centric approaches that, at times, might be more appropriate (Janssen, Lee, 
Bharosa & Cresswell, 2010). Thus, although there is a clear need for interventions to 
facilitate teamwork during extreme emergencies, there is a general lack of consensus on how 
to best develop and implement changes in practice.  
A persistent failure of emergency management research is the inability to translate 
findings into practice (Piotrowski, 2010). The majority of research exploring disaster 
management has tended to focus on identifying general challenges to emergencies via 
observations and interviews. These general challenges have included unpredictability, high 
risk, time pressure, resource shortages, large-scale disruption to infrastructure, multiple 
authorities and conflicts of interest (Chen, Sharman, Rao & Upadhyaya, 2008; James, 2011; 
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Janssen et al., 2010). Emergencies have also been described as reflecting ‘un-ness’ as they 
are unexpected, undesirable, unimaginable and generally unmanageable (Hewitt, 1983). 
Although useful for building descriptive knowledge about the difficulties presented during 
emergencies, these categories are too broad and not useful for guiding the development of 
interventions to improve practice. Many challenges interact with one another (e.g., an 
unpredictable environment is likely to also be ambiguous) making it difficult to target and 
measure the impact of interventions on team processing. Furthermore, although solutions via 
training or technology are often recommended (Janssen et al., 2010), there is a lack of 
research that tests these solutions or empirically validates technologies in the field. Indeed, 
solutions for one type of challenge might exacerbate another; digital communications could 
alleviate time pressure by increasing the speed of information sharing, but an unintended 
byproduct might be information overload if technology is designed without consideration of 
psychological or human factors relating to cognitive load (Charman, 2014; Janssen, et al., 
2010). This is especially problematic at the multi-team level, wherein different emergency 
services use different internal protocols and communications platforms, making it difficult to 
identify how to reach consensus across organizations in terms of which structures should be 
commonly adopted or implemented in support of interoperability. This paper argues that a 
more targeted approach to identify teamwork failures, develop interventions and validate 
them in the field should be a gold standard for research in emergency contexts. 
To facilitate a more systematic understanding of challenges in high-risk 
environments, Alison, Power, van den Heuvel and Waring (2015) distinguished between 
endogenous uncertainty, relating to the inherent challenges of a high-risk incident, and 
exogenous uncertainty, relating to challenges with the operating system and teamwork. They 
found, during a live counter-terrorism training exercise, that 75% of uncertainties were 
related to exogenous team issues. The authors recommended that interventions to reduce 
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uncertainty in high-risk environments should specifically target exogenous challenges, which 
might in turn reduce inherent endogenous challenges. In a second study, the authors used 
cognitive interviews to explore exogenous challenges in emergency teams and found that 
uncertainty was related to four sources: trust issues, competition, poor role understanding and 
communication (Power & Alison, 2017a). Although more research is needed to 
comprehensively identify the challenges to emergency teamwork, these challenges provide a 
starting point that will be used in this paper to integrate research on emergency teamwork 
within the existing team processing framework (e.g., Wilson et al., 2015).  
Cooperation during emergencies 
Cooperative teams are those whose team members are motivated to work together in 
pursuit of collective goals due to shared attitudes, beliefs and feelings that drive behavioral 
action (Salas, et al., 2015). Examples of cooperation in emergency teams might include 
paramedics responding to orders from police officers when operating in time pressured 
environments, or firefighters providing backup behavior to paramedics who are overloaded 
and in need of support. However, cooperation breakdowns can occur when team members 
lack desire and motivation to work together (Wilson et al., 2007); for example, refusing to 
complete tasks requested by another team member, or watching team members make 
mistakes and failing to intervene. In emergency contexts, cooperation is vital for team 
effectiveness as having the motivation and the desire to work together can support a team 
member’s willingness to take extreme risks. However, cooperation is uniquely challenged as 
emergency teams are often temporary and dynamic, meaning that team members rotate and 
are unfamiliar at an interpersonal level. Related to cooperation, Power and Alison (2017a) 
identified two challenges to emergency teamwork: (i) trust issues; and (ii) competition 
between team members. They suggest that these challenges impeded cooperation as they 
reduced team members’ motivation to work together.  
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Trust issues. Trust, defined as the willingness to be vulnerable to the advice or 
behavior of others (Mayer, Davis & Shoorman, 1995), is important for cooperation as it can 
lead to greater information sharing and faster decision-making, whilst reducing the potential 
for misunderstanding between team members (Wilson et al., 2007). During an ambiguous and 
complex emergency requiring rapid action, team members who trust each other would be 
more willing to place faith in the advice provided by other team members without question. 
Trust enables team members to expedite decision making in high-risk contexts due to the 
belief that team members are working towards collective goals and will support one another 
(Das & Teng, 2004).  
McAllister (1995) distinguished between two types of trust: affective trust (i.e., faith 
in another’s benevolence) and cognitive trust (i.e., faith in the abilities/skills of others). 
Affective trust is subjective and relies on the experiences and/or observations of others during 
interactions, whereas cognitive trust is objective and relies on the use of measures such as 
qualifications and skills (seen or assumed based on the trusted other’s role) (Leana & Van 
Buren III, 1999). In organizational contexts, such as the Emergency Services, a specific type 
of cognitive trust that is especially relevant to performance is role-based trust: the knowledge 
that a person in a given role will perform given duties (Kramer, 1999). During emergencies, 
where teams are temporary and dynamic, role-based trust might facilitate cooperation as 
members are motivated to work with and support others based on an understanding of their 
responsibilities in the team network rather than interpersonal experience. Indeed, Curnin, 
Owen, Paton, Trist and Parsons (2015) found that role understanding was the main 
contributing factor to rapid action in emergency teams. Similarly, Pollock (2013) described 
how a poor understanding of roles during the London 7/7 bombings impeded responding; for 
example, when emergency personnel failed to recognize that some of the first ambulance 
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staff to arrive at the scene were there as incident officers rather than paramedics and so were 
not responsible for treating casualties.  
 It is possible that emergency contexts are enhanced by specific types of trust. Power 
and Alison (2017a) found that high levels of affective trust impeded emergency responding, 
specifically at the command level when trusted advice conflicted with personal judgements 
on strategic planning. Commanders were conflicted between their own judgement and the 
conflicting advice of trusted others. Under conditions of low time pressure and risk 
disagreements with trusted others might be overcome via deliberation to reach consensus or, 
when time pressure is high, deferring to the advice of trusted others in order to reduce 
cognitive load by not having to process information (De Wever, Martens & Vandenbempt, 
2005; Thorgren & Wincent, 2011). Yet the fast paced and high-stakes context of emergencies 
creates an environment wherein deliberation to reach consensus is impractical, whilst blind 
adherence to advice is unacceptable. Indeed, the use of hierarchical command structures in 
emergency teams helps to reduce these effects by giving primacy to one decision maker who 
commands and controls the exercise (DOH, 2005; Salmon et al., 2011); allowing them to 
consider the advice of others, but to take the final decision on how to coordinate their team. 
However, Comfort and Kapucu (2006), in their review of the response to the 9/11 World 
Trade Centre attacks, warned that rigid hierarchy when operating under the dynamic and 
urgent conditions of a disaster can impede teamwork by reducing adaptability (e.g., who 
makes a decision when key personnel are missing?). An important question for future 
research is how to manage trust in the age of ‘interoperability’, when commanders of equal 
status across the Police, Fire and Ambulance Services must come together to make decisions 
with no clear accountability. As will be discussed later in this paper, a solution might be via 
interventions to specifically develop role-based trust in emergency teams.   
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Intra-agency competition and inter-team conflict.  A second challenge to 
cooperation in emergency teams is related to competition and conflict between team 
members who seek to prioritize their own (personal or intra-agency) goals over collective 
goals. Power and Alison (2017a) identified how cooperation can break down in emergency 
teams at the intra-team level, when team members pursued personal goals (e.g., to be a 
‘hero’) at the expense of collective goals, and at the inter-team level, when teams competed 
to take primacy or to prioritize their own agency’s goals at the scene. In line with the 
psychological literature on teamwork, it is suggested that Power and Alison’s (2017a) 
findings reflect intra-team competition, whereby individuals seek to achieve their own goals 
at the expense of collective goals (Deutsch, 1949), and inter-team conflict, wherein sub-
organizational team goals collide with one another. This distinction is important as 
interventions to reduce intra-team competition and inter-team conflict differ. For example, 
competition might be reduced by reorienting team members to focus on group goals in place 
of individual goals; whereas conflict could be reduced by providing a forum that enables 
deliberation and consensus over which goal to prioritize at a given point of time.  
A culture of competition reflects the active desire between team members to 
outperform one another; the antithesis to cooperation. Competition is not always negative as 
within-team competition can be useful when it encourages team members to work harder 
(Crawford & LePine, 2012). Yet, the time criticality of emergencies requires rapid action and 
so there is little time for disagreement and discussion, especially for incident commanders 
who must rapidly set strategic or tactical parameters for responders on the ground to operate 
within. He, Baruch and Lin (2014) distinguished between development competition, which 
empowers team members to compete in pursuit of the collective team goals, and team 
hypercompetition; the desire of team members to outperform each other in pursuit of self-
serving rather than collective goals. Team hypercompetition would be problematic if, for 
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example, team members deviate from the hierarchical command structure and seek to take on 
responsibilities outside their remit, such as inappropriately trying to lead and direct a team in 
line with the way they think they should be operating. 
At the multi-team level, disagreement between team members is characterized by 
conflict, specifically related to goals. Indeed, paramedics seeking to treat casualties might be 
prevented from achieving their goal (i.e., ‘save life’) if the fire and police services declare the 
zone as too high-risk for operations (i.e., ‘protect responders’) creating inter-team goal 
conflict. This is related to uncertainty about who should take ‘primacy’ (main control) at an 
incident (Power & Alison, 2017a). At the ground level, this could be associated to conflict 
between ambulance and fire responders to a road traffic collision who might disagree over 
whether to extricate a casualty via a spine board (slower but safer) or via rapid removal 
(riskier but quicker). This type of decision lacks clear authority as paramedics have expertise 
about the medical status of the casualty, whilst the fire service has expertise over the risk of 
conducting different extrications, meaning the potential for conflict between team members 
about the ‘right’ strategy is high. Conflict might also arise if team members misinterpret one 
another’s goals. It was found during a multi-agency counter-terrorism training exercise that, 
although all agencies agreed that they were working towards a ‘save life’ goal, how they 
interpreted this goal through their own organizationally informed lens differed (Power & 
Alison, 2017b). When operating under pressure, this conflict between sub-group and 
collective multi-team goals might derail cooperation as team members favor actions in 
support of salient and familiar sub-group goals over collective ones.  
The solutions section of this paper will consider how competition and conflict in multi-
team settings could be reduced via the development of multi-team decision models and 
procedural guidelines that facilitate clear goal identification. A greater understanding of 
concrete objectives within the team network will facilitate cooperation as individuals 
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understand the motivations driving other team members, allowing them to prioritize goals 
more effectively. Training to increase a shared ‘cultural interoperability’ between emergency 
workers will help to embed shared values, reduce competition and increase cooperation. 
Coordination during emergencies: Poor role understanding 
 Coordination is the enactment of behavioral and cognitive mechanisms that enable 
teams to sequence, synchronize and integrate their efforts to complete goal-relevant tasks 
(Salas et al., 2015; Wilson et al., 2007). Coordination is essential for teamwork in complex 
environments as it allows multiple individuals and groups to work together effectively. Team 
coordination is associated with behaviors such as mutual performance monitoring (i.e., 
monitoring other team members’ behavior to ‘catch errors’), backup behavior (i.e., ability to 
provide feedback or assistance to team members), and adaptability (i.e., ability for teams to 
adapt to cues and changes in the environment; Wilson et al., 2007). A coordinated emergency 
team responding to a road traffic collision might involve a paramedic spotting a fuel leak 
from a car that a fire team is working on (mutual performance monitoring), the paramedic 
informing the fire team and offering their assistance to adapt procedures (backup behavior) 
and the team adapting to this information by rapidly extricating the casualty (fire adaptation), 
with the paramedic team ready to treat and transfer the patient to hospital (paramedic 
adaptability).  
Coordination is one of the most commonly studied topics in disaster and emergency 
management (e.g. Chen et al., 2008), yet the capacity for coordination in emergency teams 
remains poor (Salmon et al., 2011). Coordination is facilitated by accurate shared mental 
models between team members that allow them to monitor, predict and adapt to the crisis 
environment. Shared mental models “allow team members to draw on their own well-
structured knowledge as a basis for selecting actions that are consistent and coordinated 
with those of their teammates” (p.274; Mathieu et al., 2000). In teams, mental models can be 
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separated into two types: task mental models (i.e., shared situational awareness and 
knowledge about tasks) and team mental models (i.e., shared knowledge about team 
members, their roles, their strengths/weaknesses, skills; Banks & Millward, 2007). Shared 
mental models develop over time as cognitive emergent states (Millward, Banks & Riga, 
2010) and can be task-specific and related to real-time situational awareness on the ground. 
For example, ‘common operational pictures’ have been identified as important for emergency 
teams as they contribute to a shared understanding of the unfolding situation between team 
members, enhanced by the use of ‘cognitive artefacts’ (i.e., information representations in the 
world, e.g. interactive white board; Salmon et al., 2011). 
Power and Alison (2017a) identified how a poor understanding of roles degraded 
coordination. As discussed earlier, poor role-based trust can impede cooperation as team 
members lack faith in other team members to perform their role; a poor understanding of 
roles can impede coordination as team members are unsure how to synchronize behaviors; 
for example, impeding sense-making and the development of common operational pictures 
(i.e., knowing who is responsible for a given task/holding specific information). Poor role 
understanding was found to occur at the individual level when team members appeared to be 
unaware of their own responsibilities (e.g., not fulfilling one’s own responsibility to make a 
decision), and at the team level when team members lacked an understanding of each other’s 
roles and responsibilities (Power & Alison, 2017a). Teams that lack a clear articulation of 
roles have been found to reduce information sharing and general coordination, operating in 
silos rather than as a collective team (Perry & Wears, 2011; Pollock, 2013).  
An understanding of roles in a team can be classified as ‘team knowledge’, a 
cognitive emergent state relating to the team’s awareness and anticipation of the skills and 
behaviors of others. This differs to task-related knowledge, associated with awareness of the 
materials needed or being used to complete a task (Salas et al., 2005). Team knowledge is 
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related to the team’s ‘transactive memory system’, a shared understanding about who is 
responsible for different types of knowledge during a task (Wegner, 1987). In a study looking 
at police tactical teamwork, it was found that implicit (i.e., non-verbal) coordination 
improved team adaptability and performance and that this effect was greater for teams with 
transactive memory systems (i.e., knowledge of each other’s roles and responsibilities; 
Marques-Quinteiro, Curral, Passos & Lewis, 2013). In other words, role understanding 
enhances adaptability and performance in teams relying on implicit modes of coordination 
(i.e., non-verbal), making it important for teamwork in high-stakes and time-pressured critical 
incidents. This paper suggests that coordination can be improved by research to support the 
development of effective socio-technical team networks (e.g., linked communication 
platforms, shared technologies), incorporating both prior knowledge about roles and 
responsibilities and using adaptive technology to share relevant knowledge and inform sense-
making during crises.  
Communications during emergencies: Inefficient and ineffective communication 
Communication facilitates problem solving in teams by enabling effective 
information exchange, directing actions and sharing perspectives about the emergency 
(McIntyre & Salas, 1995; Orasanu, 1994). It is a reciprocal process that involves the sending 
and receiving of information between team members in order to form and revise attitudes, 
behaviors and cognitions (Salas, et al., 2015). In their analyses of Incident Management 
Teams deployed to emergencies in Australia, Hayes and Omodei (2011) identified 
communication as a moderator to team effectiveness - teams who communicated better were 
more effective in achieving their goals. When operating in high-stakes and complex contexts, 
it is important that communication is appropriate in order to update shared mental models 
(Salas, Cannon-Bowers & Johnston, 1997). It would be unhelpful if a paramedic updated the 
commanding police officer on the status of every casualty as this specific information is 
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irrelevant to the police, would delay decision-making and risk cognitive overload; instead 
they would follow a structure of communications whereby the paramedic updates their team 
leader who can liaise relevant information to their multi-agency partners. Likewise, when 
crucial information is discovered, it must be rapidly shared with those who need it. 
Communication must be relevant in terms of what is said, to whom it is said and how the 
message is communicated. Effective communications facilitate common relevant operating 
pictures (McMaster & Baber, 2012). Unnecessary communications, such as information 
about one’s role-specific procedural knowledge, has been found to worsen performance 
(Banks & Millward, 2007).  
Despite the importance of communication, it is repeatedly identified as being 
problematic in emergency contexts. Power and Alison (2017a) identified that 
miscommunication and insufficient updating were core challenges to emergency decision-
making, which in fast paced and dynamic emergencies meant that commanders struggled to 
keep pace with the situation and establish which pieces of information remained relevant. An 
evaluation of a live multi-agency disaster training exercise found that multi-team 
communication was impeded by incompatible communication channels (i.e., using different 
technologies to log information), a poor understanding of information relevance, and lack of 
trust in the information they received (Bharosa, Lee & Janssen, 2010). Communication 
failures also arose when different teams or individuals perceive different messages in 
different ways, depending upon their own perspectives and biases (Bandow, 2001). For 
example, the ‘save life’ strategic goal commonly used by emergency teams could be 
interpreted in different ways by different emergency response teams with regards to whose 
life this referred to – the citizens in the risk area; the emergency responders operating inside 
the risk area; or the wider public around the risk area (Power & Alison, 2017b). Thus, there 
remains issues around how to facilitate timely, relevant and clear communications.  
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Solutions to Emergency Teamwork 
 The remainder of this paper will explore how emergency teamwork might be 
improved via solutions-focused research. Emergencies are inherently complex, but a resilient 
emergency team can control and reduce complexity. Interventions to develop ‘soft resilience’ 
(i.e., to enhance flexibility and agility in the team network) are arguably more useful than 
those that build ‘hard resilience’ (i.e., development of robustness and redundancy in a 
network) as they increase adaptation to uncertainty (Miao, Banister & Tang 2013). This paper 
will provide recommendations for how processing might be improved in emergency teams; 
specifically framing this around how it can be practically achieved through: (i) teamwork 
training; (ii) developing a socio-technical team network; and (iii) changes to policies and 
procedural guidelines. Importantly, all of these recommendations are grounded in the 
assumption that they will be empirically tested and validated in the real-world to bridge the 
gap between theory and practice. 
Interventions through teamwork training. It has been argued that multi-agency 
training is the key to improving multi-team coordination during emergencies (Salmon et al., 
2011). Training enables individuals to develop their skills whilst operating in safe 
environments. It can be delivered using a range of formats, such as classroom teaching, table 
top exercises, immersive simulations or live exercises. Live exercises, for example, can last a 
number of hours or days to simulate a real-world emergency using role-players who act as 
casualties and civilians to test responding. ‘Hydra’ is an example of an immersive simulated 
learning environment that has been used to train decision making in emergency teams - 
running delegates through an unfolding multi-stage decision scenario wherein they log 
decisions and dynamically interact with the information they receive (Alison, et al., 2013).  
Emergency teams participate in regular training as part of their ongoing professional 
development. However, there is a heavy emphasis on the development of technical skills 
Running	head:	EXTREME	TEAMS	AND	MAJOR	EMERGENCIES	
	 19	
(e.g., testing capabilities to respond to a chemical attack, testing procedures for mass 
evacuation of civilians) and less emphasis on the development of competencies related to 
teamwork and decision making (e.g., how to reach consensus on decisions, how to coordinate 
behaviors). In their evaluation of a multi-agency training course, Wilson and Gosiewska 
(2014) found that trainees perceived team interaction as the most important benefit of 
training, over and above traditional training outcomes such as having the opportunity to 
practice skills and receive feedback. Thus, rather than assume that training facilitates 
teamwork by proxy of social interaction during practical skills development, it is argued that 
training should explicitly focus on the development of teamwork competencies. 
 One area of focus for emergency teamwork training is to develop a shared and 
accurate understanding of roles and responsibilities across the team network. As discussed, a 
poor understanding of roles can reduce cooperation as team members lack cognitive trust in 
others’ abilities, and impede coordination as team members fail to communicate relevant 
information to each other. A positive example of how team training has progressed in recent 
years is via the UK’s Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP), whose 
goal was to enhance interoperability between emergency services (JESIP, 2016). They ran a 
series of multi-agency classroom-based training days, which brought commanders from the 
emergency services together to run through incidents in slow time and discuss the roles and 
capabilities of different agencies. This can be beneficial for building knowledge about the 
capabilities of less familiar team members, whilst debunking any myths or misunderstandings 
about other team members. Further research to explore the effects of such training on inter-
team attitudes and behavior is needed.  
Teamwork training can also be beneficial for developing role-based trust: trust based 
on the knowledge that a person in a given role will perform given duties (Kramer, 1999). 
Indeed, ‘dynamic’ or ‘flash’ teams, where membership is fluid, are typical of emergency 
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teams, and increasingly common in wider organizations (Tannenbaum, Mathieu, Salas & 
Cohen, 2012). Klein, Ziegert, Knight and Xiao (2006) defined dynamic teams as ‘extreme 
action teams’, whose members must cooperate to perform urgent and high-consequence tasks 
whilst coping with frequent changes in team composition. As such, the notion of building 
affective trust over time through repeated teamwork episodes is problematic as team 
members have not worked together before (Marks, et al., 2001). Curnin et al., (2015) argued 
that temporary emergency teams are reliant on rapid or ‘swift’ trust, which is facilitated by 
clear role understanding. Role-based trust could further contribute to a sense of ‘collective 
efficacy’: the team’s shared belief in its conjoint abilities to organize teamwork and execute 
action (Millward et al., 2010), in spite of limited interpersonal experience. Thus, training 
should be designed to specifically develop de-individualized knowledge about roles so that 
responders understand the expected competencies of a given role; a recommendation that can 
also apply to sporadic organizational teams outside of the emergency context. 
In addition to role understanding, teamwork training might also be usefully designed 
to generate a shared sense of culture and values. Research on ‘cultural interoperability’ in 
emergency teams has identified how, despite police and ambulance staff describing a 
common identity based on their need to deal with the ‘nastier side of life’, this was not 
something they felt they shared with the fire service, whose role they were less familiar with 
(Charman, 2014). However, when thinking about a common ‘emergency service’ identity, 
police and ambulance participants identified more closely with the fire service. This suggests 
that cultural identification with others can influence a team members’ willingness to 
cooperate with others. Furthermore, ingroup identification has been found to predict 
collective efficacy and trust in teams (Fransen, et al., 2014) and increase the perceived clarity 
of task-relevant communications (Greenaway, Wright, Willingham, Reynolds & Haslam, 
2015). It is important that multi-agency teamwork training is therefore designed in a way that 
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considers the role of organizational identities to foster ‘cultural interoperability’ and support 
joint working. Research to better understand how multi-team training interacts with 
organizational identity, attitudes and behaviors is needed. 
Developing a Socio-Technical Team Network. Emergency teamwork can also be 
facilitated by research on how to strengthen and develop the socio-technical team network. A 
socio-technical network is the structure of individuals, sub-teams and technologies that are 
used to exchange information and coordinate behavior. An evaluation of the emergency 
response to the hurricanes that hit the State of Florida in 2004 found that technology 
significantly aided response efforts by providing a rapid platform for the communication of 
safety messages to the public (Kapucu, 2008). Furthermore, geographic information systems 
and interactive maps were essential for updating situation awareness (e.g., noting the location 
of downed trees and power lines). Alternatively, it was found in an in-depth study of a train 
derailment in Cumbria (UK) that inter-agency coordination was impeded due to a poor 
understanding of the disaster management system that was being used; communications 
between team members were lost in the socio-technical network as individuals passed 
messages to a central communication center, but it was not clear who sent which message 
when they were disseminated to other agencies (Smith & Dowell, 2000). The socio-technical 
network is essential for creating a shared situational awareness between team members and 
facilitating interoperability. Research to identify what an effective socio-technical network 
should look like is imperative to enhance team processing, information sharing and the 
maintenance of relevant and common situational awareness. 
One way to improve the team network could be via the adoption of common 
communication styles, both virtually and in the real world. The psychological literature on 
communication suggests that the utility of different communication styles is dependent upon 
context. For example, ‘closed-loop communications’ (CLC), whereby messages are sent, 
Running	head:	EXTREME	TEAMS	AND	MAJOR	EMERGENCIES	
	 22	
acknowledged and verified, can be useful for enabling rapid teamwork (Salas et al., 2005; 
Wilson et al., 2007). A study on emergency medical teams found that CLC improved team 
performance, but only during predictable algorithm-based tasks and not for knowledge-driven 
tasks that required interpretation (Schmutz, Hoffman, Heimberg & Manser, 2015). CLC are 
thus useful in predictable environments, but are less adaptable to complex or novel contexts 
as teams must communicate to understand the situation. This is important when considering 
the design of novel systems and technologies that might be used to share information during 
emergency teamwork as the style of communications must fit or be adaptable to the 
requirements of different tasks (Mendonca, Jefferson & Harald, 2007).  
In their analysis of the emergency response to the World Trade Centre Attacks in 
2001, Comfort and Kapucu (2006) recommended that future inter-organizational systems 
must be auto-adaptive in order to cope with the unbounded uncertainty that is typical of large 
scale emergencies. A socio-technical structure should support five distinct phases of extreme 
teamwork: (i) information search; (ii) information exchange with other organizations; (iii) 
sensemaking and strategy selection; (iv) adaptation of, or action to implement strategic; and 
(v) evaluation of actions taken and modifications if required. The process is underpinned by 
organizational learning and adjustment to unforeseen events during emergencies. Comfort 
and Kapucu (2006) described how the events of 9/11 were so extreme and incomprehensible 
that they exceeded the sensemaking abilities of on-site security guards in the South Tower 
who failed to recognize the potential collapse of the tower and instructed employees to 
remain inside the building. They contrasted this to the quick actions of more experienced 
federal officials to mobilize communications equipment to New York; arguing that their 
expertise facilitated sensemaking under extreme conditions. They argue that an auto-adaptive 
socio-technical system must be designed to rapidly share expertise and organizational 
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learning across the network under conditions of extreme uncertainty via rapid and clear 
communications. 
In addition to considering the process of communication, it is important to be aware 
of the content of shared information. This is especially important for emergency teams due to 
the range of acronyms and specialist language used in this context (e.g., ‘HART’ for 
‘Hazardous Area Response Team’; ‘SRT’ for Search and Rescue Team). Although acronyms 
can expedite team processing in fast paced environments, their use risks miscommunication 
when working in unfamiliar teams (Laakso, 2013). Terminology can be specific to agencies, 
specialist teams within agencies, and further regionally influenced across the country and 
abroad. The UK’s Emergency Services have encouraged ‘acronym free’ communications 
between agencies as best practice (JESIP, 2016). Although useful to aid understanding, there 
is a risk that this might delay communications due to the increased cognitive load required to 
translate back from common acronyms to plain English, or that practitioners might simply 
not adopt this technique when under pressure. A technological solution might be to develop a 
communications platform that translates typed messages into agency-relevant language. For 
example, a paramedic might log “there are 20 P3s”, which is then automatically translated by 
the algorithm to “there are 20 walking wounded casualties” and shared with colleagues from 
other agencies. It has also been suggested that technology might be developed in the future 
that could detect and help filter out duplicated and unessential information (Mendonca et al., 
2007). 
A more human-focused solution to ensuring a smooth team network is via the use of 
‘liaison officers’; individuals who are responsible for coordinating information and action 
during an emergency and who are trained to understand the different roles in different 
emergency teams. Curnin, Owen, Paton and Brooks (2015) identified liaison officers to act as 
the ‘boundary spanners’ who link different teams together during an emergency by, for 
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example, providing the right information to the right person, clarifying roles and 
responsibilities, and generally enabling coordination. The use of liaison officers removes the 
need for other team members to fully understand the team structure as they are able to rely on 
liaison officers to provide and share relevant information to the right person. Liaison officers 
are useful for establishing common relevant operational pictures as they know which pieces 
of information should be passed on to which team member (McMaster, Baber & Houghton, 
2007), offering a non-technological solution to team processing. 
Importantly, although socio-technical solutions might help to facilitate team 
processing in theory, it is important that all members of the network use common structures. 
In their analyses of a multi-agency disaster exercise, Bharosa, et al. (2010) identified how the 
introduction of unfamiliar technologies caused team leaders to revert back to non-technical 
resources (e.g., paper maps). The return to non-technical practices can cause considerable 
issues in multi-team contexts if different agencies utilize different and/or incompatible 
procedures (Salmon, et al., 2011). If sub-teams within multi-team systems use dissimilar 
platforms for information sharing it risks a large proportion of information loss. Mendonca et 
al. (2007) argued that technology should avoid rigidity and instead be designed to support 
flexible and improvised behavior that are typical of emergencies. In order for technology to 
support emergency responding, there must be a concerted effort to empirically validate 
technologies and networked enabled capabilities with an awareness of the ‘human’ in the 
loop, especially in multi-agency settings. Although technology might offer a modern solution 
to communication during emergencies, liaison officers might be just as, if not more, effective 
when time pressure is extreme. To ensure adaptive networked enabled capabilities during 
emergency responding, there must be careful consideration of the human in the 
sociotechnical loop (McMaster & Baber, 2012; McMaster et al., 2007). 
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Changes to Policies and Procedural Guidelines. Organizational policies and 
procedures can enhance and embed team processing. In acknowledgement of the increased 
requirement for emergency services to work together during disasters, a number of 
emergency management groups across the world have developed procedural guidance to 
facilitate ‘interoperability’, defined as “the extent to which organizations can work together 
coherently as a matter of course” (p. 8, Pollock, 2013). The Australian Inter-Agency Incident 
Management System (AIIMS) is a management framework to coordinate emergency 
response and control the incident (Australian Fire Authority Council, 2004). It is based upon 
three principles: (i) functional management of the incident, whereby the incident controller 
delegates functional roles to sub-teams; (ii) the establishment of ‘spans of control’, to ensure 
that no more than five reporting groups or individuals are reporting to an individual at any 
one time; and (iii) ensuring management by objectives, where the incident controller ensures 
only one set of objectives is being used at a time (Hayes & Omodei, 2011). In the USA, the 
Incident Command System (ICS), part of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), 
was designed to help federal, state and local government coordination (Jensen & Waugh Jr, 
2014). Likewise, JESIP in UK was developed to facilitate joint working between agencies 
responding to major disasters by use of a common ‘Joint Decision Model’ (JDM) (JESIP, 
2016). 
 Although the development of collaborative management frameworks is well 
intentioned, there is limited empirical evidence to support their usefulness in practice. Jensen 
and Waugh Jr (2014) explored the efficacy of the American ICS, and warned of little 
evidence that the system was consistently used or whether it was effective in practice. They 
found that whilst the ICS has been used appropriately by some organizations, it was largely 
ignored, underused or even misused by others. They also queried the use of the ICS as an ‘all 
hazards’ solution, arguing that it may be inappropriate when applied to some disaster 
Running	head:	EXTREME	TEAMS	AND	MAJOR	EMERGENCIES	
	 26	
contexts (Jensen & Waugh Jr, 2014). In the UK, Power and Alison (2017b) suggested that, 
despite the potential usefulness of the JDM, the absence of a ‘goal-setting’ phase in the 
model was inconsistent with the plethora of research that identifies the importance of goals, 
especially in inter-organizational settings (Locke & Latham, 1990). They described how the 
use of ‘abstract’ (i.e., ambiguous) goals (such as ‘save life’) to guide multi-agency teamwork 
was inappropriate because different response agencies interpreted this goal based on their 
organizational biases, and suggested that the use of concrete objectives that are iteratively 
updated would be more appropriate. Likewise, NIMS in the US has been criticized for being 
ineffective if goals are not consistent or clearly identified (Chen et al., 2008). Criticisms such 
as these do not suggest that policies and procedures are inherently redundant. Instead, they 
offer a gateway through which psychological research can be used to inform operational 
practice. This is especially apparent in emergency contexts as policies and procedures are 
crucial for trying to standardize and reduce variation in human behavior when operating in 
chaotic environments. It is thus crucial that efforts are made to provide an evidence-based 
rationale for future emergency guidelines. 
 Empirical validation: translating theory into practice. A final point to make when 
discussing the potential solutions to emergency teamwork is the importance of empirical 
validation of solutions. A core limitation to research on emergency teamwork is the gap 
between theory and practice. This gap can occur due to ignorance on both sides; whereby 
researchers fail to clearly outline how theoretical conclusions can be applied in the real-world 
or acknowledge the practical constraints that limit their application, and practitioners 
selectively choose solutions from the literature that seem to fit strategic objectives, but fail to 
empirically validate their effectiveness on the incident ground. It is paramount that future 
research overcomes these problems by addressing these issues through the empirical 
validation of research in naturalistic and applied settings.  
Running	head:	EXTREME	TEAMS	AND	MAJOR	EMERGENCIES	
	 27	
 An example of incorporating theory into practice can be taken from a series of recent 
papers on UK emergency decision making. This research began with the development of the 
theoretical ‘SAFE-T’ model of emergency decision making (van den Heuvel, Alison & 
Crego, 2012), which described how effective decision making should follow phases of 
‘Situation Assessment (SA)’, ‘Plan Formulation (F)’, ‘Plan Execution (E)’ and ‘Team 
learning (T)’, whilst identifying the specific cognitive biases and decision errors derailed this 
process. This theoretical model was then tested by researchers working with the Fire Service, 
where it was found that incident commanders repeatedly skipped from situation assessment 
straight to plan execution phases (Cohen-Hatton, Butler & Honey, 2015). The authors warned 
that skipping the plan formulation phase might impede decision making as it would limit the 
reflexive process when considering the goals or reasons ‘why’ for action. To mitigate these 
effects, Cohen-Hatton and Honey (2015) developed a training intervention using ‘decision 
controls’ to encourage commanders to think ‘why am I doing this?’ prior to taking action. 
The results of this study were impressive; commanders increased their use of ‘plan 
formulation’ during responding, yet this did not increase the time it took for them to make 
decisions. As a result, guidance on using these ‘decision controls’ has now been implemented 
into operational guidance for the UK Fire Service (CFOA, 2015). The successful bridging 
between theory (van den Heuvel et al., 2012) and practice (CFOA, 2015) was fundamentally 
driven by empirical validation (Cohen-Hatton, et al., 2015). We argue that this model of best 
practice should be used to guide future research to improve emergency teamwork. 
Conclusion 
Whether the result of man-made or natural causes, major emergencies and disasters 
are an increasing reality in modern day society. Psychological research has made great 
advances in understanding how teams operate in general organizational settings, but there is a 
paucity of research that specifically examines how emergency teams operate in high-risk and 
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complex environments. This is important due to the unique stressors associated with 
emergency teams who must coordinate their behavior under extreme pressures, often in 
sporadically forming and multi-layered teams, which limits the application of traditional 
teamwork research from more artificial and low-stakes settings. By fitting the limited 
research on emergency teamwork within a team processing framework, this paper has 
provided a first step in bridging understanding between experts in disaster management and 
researchers studying the psychology of teams. To move this collaboration forward there must 
be a common and agreed understanding between researchers and emergency service 
practitioners; namely that research, to be useful, must have buy-in from practitioners 
operating in the real-world who can implement findings, and commitment from researchers 
that their research findings have contextualized and relevant application to support practice. 
This can be achieved by designing research projects that explore team processing, but 
provide solutions-focused recommendations oriented around new training, novel socio-
technical systems, or changes to policies and procedural guidelines. This paper has thus 
served to highlight the growing need for research on how extreme emergency teams operate 
in these uniquely challenging environments, and offered a solutions-focused framework from 
which future research might grow. 
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